Admiralty — The Maximum Cure Rule as a Limitation on the Maintenance and Cure Remedy — Cox v. Drano Corp by Abcarian, Michael
Boston College Law Review
Volume 17
Issue 4 Number 4 Article 5
4-1-1976
Admiralty — The Maximum Cure Rule as a
Limitation on the Maintenance and Cure Remedy
— Cox v. Drano Corp
Michael Abcarian
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Admiralty Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael Abcarian, Admiralty — The Maximum Cure Rule as a Limitation on the Maintenance and Cure
Remedy — Cox v. Drano Corp, 17 B.C.L. Rev. 648 (1976), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/
vol17/iss4/5
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Admiralty—The Maximum Cure Rule as a Limitation on the
Maintenance and Cure Remedy—Cox v. Dravo Corp.'—Plaintiff's
deceased, William Cox was employed as a seaman on one of defend-
ant Dravo Corp.'s vessels.' Cox sustained spinal injuries while serv-
ing aboard the ship and instituted an action under the Jones Act3 to
recover damages caused by the negligence of the defendant and the
unseaworthiness of the ship.' Cox sought compensation for total and
permanent disability, past and future pain and suffering, and past
and future lost earnings. 5 The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff
in the amount of $75,000. 8 Since the defendant had been paying Cox
maintenance from the time of his injury, no claim for maintenance
and cure 7 was filed," Defendant continued to pay such maintenance
until December 7, 1966, almost one year after the jury verdict estab-
lishing defendant's negligence."
In 1968, plaintiff instituted an action in the federal district court
claiming maintenance from December 7, 1966 in the amount of
$19,524 plus interest and cure in the amount of $3,111.13."' The
517 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1975).
2 Cox v. Dravo Corp., 372 F. Stipp. 1003, 1004 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
3 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
4 517 F.2d at 621. If an individual is injured because a vessel is unable to with-
stand the perils of an ordinary voyage at sea, he may seek compensation based on a
theory of unseaworthiness. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549 (1960);
Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 100 (1944).
' 517 F.2(1 at 621.
372 F. Stipp. at 1004.
T Maintenance is defined as the food and lodging to which a seaman is entitled
while in the service of the shipowner, and cure is defined as the medical care to which
the seaman is entitled if he is injured, or becomes ill while in the service of the ship-
owner. 2 M. NORRES, THE LAW OF SEA MEN 1}§ 539, 542, 543 (3d ed. 1970).
in the service of the ship" generally means that the seaman is answerable to the
call of duty rather than the fact that he is actually performing the tasks required of his
employment. Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 516 (1949); Shaw v. Ohio River
Co., 526 F.2d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 1975).
The maintenance and cure remedy is not derived from any duty of indemnifica-
tion or compensation, or from concepts of negligence. The shipowner's liability for the
remedy arises solely from his functional relationship with the seaman he has employed.
Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367 -, 371 (1932). Negligence on the part
of the seaman, short of culpable or wilful misconduct will not preclude the seaman's en-
titlement to maintenance and cure. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 731
(1943).
An injured or ill seaman may bring actions against the shipowner for negligence
and unseaworthiness under the ,Jones Act, 46 U•S.C. § 688 (1970), and actions for
maintenance and cure, Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528 (1938); Cortes v.
Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., supra at 371. See note 4 supra. Damages awarded for the
two claims are not duplicative when the law controlling each is properly applied. See
Cox, 517 F.2d at 622-23.
" Ordinarily, negligence and unseaworthiness claims under the Jones Act, 46
U.S.C. § 688 (1970), and claims Ibr maintenance and cure must be joined when the
claims arise under the same set of facts. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S.
16, 21 (1963).
" 517 F•2d at 621-22.
'° The claim for maintenance was calculated at $8.00 per (lay for '2,453 days.
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claim for cure was based upon Cox's need for physiotherapy and
medical attention necessary for the alleviation of pain resulting from
his spinal injuries." The court noted that Cox had been compensated
for his total and permanent disability by the jury verdict in the prior
action.' 2
 Nevertheless, the court felt bound by applicable prior
decisions" of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit to award cure for the reduction of pain." Accordingly, the court
awarded plaintiff the amount of his claim for cure, but denied the
claim for the requested maintenance."
On appeal by both parties, the Third Circuit affirmed the judg-
ment of the district court on the maintenance claim and reversed the
judgment on the award of cure. The Third Circuit HELD: A seaman
who has suffered total and permanent disability while in the service of
the ship is entitled to maintenance and cure only until his condition
has reached the point of maximum . medical recovery; that is, the
point at which further medical care cannot produce any curative im-
provement in the disabling condition. He cannot thereafter recover
for continuing pain." In deciding this case, the Third Circuit partially
overruled the cases which had heretofore provided authority for
The claim for cure was based upon the actual costs of physiotherapy and medical atten-
tion required by Cox for the alleviation of pain resulting from his spinal injuries. The
costs involved in both claims were calculated from December 7, 1966 until William
Cox's death on August 8, 1973. 517 F.2d at 622.
The maintenance which an ill seaman may secure from a shipowner is of a kind
and quantity to which the seaman would be entitled while at sea. See, e.g., Calmar S.S.
Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528 (1938). Although the remedy is referred to as
maintenance and cure, most seamen seek only payments for maintenance since cure is
often effected through access to the marine hospitals operated by the United States
Public Health Service. Seamen availing themselves of these medical facilities receive
treatment on a reduced or no-cost basis. 2 M. NORRIS, supra note 7, 11 595 at 135. How-
ever the seaman may avail himself of other medical facilities, and recover the costs ex-
pended for maintenance and cure while undergoing treatment at such alternative
facilities. See Scott v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 152 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. La. 1957). A claim for
maintenance does not include the time that the seaman is an in-patient at a marine
hospital, or for which he receives other collateral compensation for maintenance costs.
Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 518 (1949); Shaw v. Ohio River Co., 526 F.2d
193, 200 (3d Cir. 1975).
372 F. Supp. at 1005.
"Id. at 1007-1008.
"Ward v. Union Barge Line Corp., 443 F.2d 565 (3d Cir. 1971); Nell v. Dravo
Corp., 407 F.2d 228 (3d Cir. 1969).
" 372 F.Supp. at 1006.
IS Id. at 1008. The maintenance and cure remedy is generally perceived as a
single remedy. Establishing a right to cure necessarily establishes a coextensive right to
maintenance while undergoing cure. See Vitco v. Joncich, 130 F. Supp 945, 949 (S.D.
Cal. 1955), fed, 234 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1956); C. GILMORE & C. 'BLACK, THE LAW OF
ADMIRALTY 105 (1975). In Cox, however, the district court denied Cox's claim for
maintenance upon a finding that the award in the negligence and unseaworthiness ac-
tions brought previously under the Jones Act included damages representing the costs
of maintenance for the period in question. 372 F. Supp. at 1009. The denial of mainte-
nance in the district court action was thus employed to prevent a duplication of dam-
ages. Id.; accord, Shaw v. Ohio River Co., 526 F.2d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 1975).
1 " 517 F.2d at 627.
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plaintiffs such as Cox to recover maintenance and cure. The stated
purpose of overruling these cases was one of conforming the Third
Circuit's application of the maintenance and cure doctrine with that
pronounced by the United States Supreme Court." The significance
of the Cox decision lies not only in the fact that the Third Circuit is
now in line with the Supreme Court's decisions, but also in the fact
that in a brief concurring opinion's it was implied that a different re-
sult may be appropriate where the plaintiff seeks payments to arrest a
deteriorating physical condition, rather than payments for the allevia-
tion of pain.' 9
This note will analyze the Cox decision in light of the present
scope of the maintenance and cure doctrine upon which the decision
is superimposed. A brief history of the doctrine will be presented,
focusing on the extent to which liability has been imposed on
shipowners and employers. The Cox decision will then be examined
against this historical background. Particular attention will be given to
the implications of the concurring opinion which seem to have
opened the door to expansion of the traditional scope of maintenance
and cure in cases where the disability is of a deteriorating character.
The note will conclude by proposing substantive changes in the ad-
ministration of the doctrine designed to better effectuate the purposes
upon which the doctrine rests.
The origins of the maintenance and cure doctrine may be traced
back to medieval sea codes. As international sea trade and travel de-
veloped into a vital and necessary instrumentality for stimulating
economic growth and _providing a new method of military capability,
it was recognized in Europe that maritime fleets were in need of con-
tinually increasing numbers of competent seamen." The hazards of
the sea, however, coupled with the ever present fear of abandonment
in a foreign port when injury or illness struck, often deterred men
from becoming seamen." In response to this situation, a number of
political entities with strong interest in expanding their maritime en-
terprises formulated sea codes which imposed upon shipowners a
duty of care toward seamen who became ill or were injured while in
the service of the ship. 22
17 517 F.2d at 621. See Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949); Calmar S.S.
Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938).
"Id. at 627.
2 a 2 M. Nonals.supra note 7, § 540-41..
"See Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S, 724, 727(1943). In Harden v.Gordon,
11 F. Cas. 480 (No. 6047) (C.C.D. Mc. 1823), Justice Story described the conditions
which accompanied the seaman's life. "Seamen are by the peculiarity of their lives liable
to sudden sickness from change of climate, exposure to perils, and exhausting labour.
They are generally poor and friendless, and acquire habits of gross indulgence,
carelessness, and improvidence." Id. at 483. This stereotype has had considerable effect
upon the evolution of the maintenance and cure doctrine in the United States. See note
44 infra.
"See 2M. NORRIS, supra note 7, § 540 for text and discussion of some of the sea
codes which gave rise to the maintenance and cure doctrine in American admiralty law.
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In the United States, the doctrine of maintenance and cure was
first applied by Justice Story in two decisions which he rendered on
circuit. The first case, Harden v. .6ordon 23 Was decided in 1823. In
Harden, the seaman became ill while in a foreign port, and subse-
quently sued the owner of the vessel for the costs of maintenance and
cure whichhe had procured in the foreign port. 24 Justice Story, sur-
veying the old sea codes, held that a duty was imposed" upon
shipowners to maintain and effect cure for seamen who became ill, or
are injured while in the service of the ship." Without delineating the
precise scope of this duty, Justice Story did state that the duty is not
limited to the time that the seaman is actually aboard the ship. 26 Once
again the impetus for the imposition of the duty was an awareness of
the harsh conditions which accompanied life at sea, and the need to
stimulate expansion of maritime enterprises in the United States."
The question left open in Harden was the extent of the liability.
imposed on the shipowners; that is, the period of time for which the
shipowner must provide maintenance and cure. Justice Story, recog-
nizing that the Harden decision arguably exposed the shipowner to the
possibility of paying a lifetime pension to a permanently disabled
seaman, addressed this question nine years later in Reed v. Canfmid 28
In Reed, the seaman sued the owner of the vessel to recover mainte-
nance and cure costs which resulted from the seaman's feet being fro-
zen while in the service of the ship." In holding the shipowner liable,
Justice Story stated that this liability extended only so far as was
necessary to effect a cure of the seaman's illness or injury:
[W]hat are the limits of this allowance? May they be ex-
tended over years or for life? Are they to be ... like the
pensions allowed by some of the maritime ordinances ....
My answer to suggestions of this sort is that ... they
[shipowners] are liable only for expenses necessarily in-
curred for the cure; and when the cure is completed, at
least so far as the ordinary medical means extend, the own-
ers are freed from all further liability.... 3 "
as1 I F. Cas. 480 (No. 6047) (C.C.D. Mc. 1823).
24
25 Id. at 482.
2" Id.
27 See note 21 supra. justice Story further stated:
If some provision be not made for them (seamen] in sickness at the ex-
pense of the ship, they must often in foreign ports suffer the accumu-
lated evils of disease, and poverty, and sometimes perish from want of
suitable nourishment.... Even the merchant himself' derives an ultimate
benefit from what may seem at first an onerous charge. It encourages
seamen to engage in perilous voyages with more promptitude, and at
lower wages....
11 F. Cas. at 983.
" 20 F. Cas. 426 (No. 11,64 I) (C.C.D. Mass, 1832).
2° Id. at 427.
39 Id. at 420. Justice Story departed to some extent from the sea codes which he
had considered in formulating the maintenance and cure doctrine. For example, Article
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This limitation provided the core concept for the present formulation
of the "maximum cure" rule. In the absence of pronouncements by
the United States Supremel Court on the issue, however, other federal
courts pursued different lines of reasoning regarding the extent of
the shipowner's duty. 3 '
In 1938, the United States Supreme Court finally addressed the
issue of the extent of liability to be imposed under the doctrine of
maintenance and cure in Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor. 32 The Court re-
versed a lower court decision which had held that if medical treat-
ment is necessary to arrest the progress of a deteriorating disability,
the seaman may be entitled to maintenance and cure for the rest of
his life. 33
 Instead, the Court held that the shipowner is liable to pro-
vide maintenance and cure only until the seaman's condition reaches
the maximum point of physical improvement which may be achieved
through the application of proper medical treatment. 34
 Liability
beyond this point would be a pension and as such, is not properly en-
compassed within the doctrine of maintenance and cure." The Court
supported its holding by examining the purposes for which the doc-
trine was created, by concluding that the remedy was designed to
35 of the Laws of Hanse Towns r1eads: "Art XXXV. The seamen are obliged to defend
their ship against rovers, on painl of losing their wages; and if they are wounded, they
shall be healed and cured at the general charge of the concerned in a common average.
If anyone of them is maimed and disabled, he shall be maintained as long as he lives by
a like average." Quoted in Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 513-14. While this lan-
guage seems to indicate a possible basis for establishing a lifetime entitlement to
maintenance, such provisions in the old sea codes have been construed by American
admiralty courts as based on circumstances which are not part of the reality of maritime
enterprises in the contemporary world.  Id.
"See, e.g., The Ben Flint, 3 F. Cas. 183 (No. 1299) (D. Wis. 1867) (the remedy is
coextensive with the period of time that the shipper holds a shipping contract); The At-
lantic, 2 F. Cas. 121 (No. 620) (S!D.N.Y. 1849) and Nevitt v. Clark, 18 F. Cas. 29 (No.
10,138) (S.D.N.Y. 1846) (the remedy is coextensive with the period of time that the
seaman is contractually entitled to wages).
' 2 303 U.S. 525 (1938).
" Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 92 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1937). The court stated:
However, in the present case we have the further fact that the incurable
disease from which the libelant suffers is of a progressive nature and is
very likely to produce fresh manifestations in the future in other parts of
his body. The uncontradicted evidence indicates that continuing care and
treatment is of the utmost importance in arresting the further progress of
the disease. Under these circumstances we cannot say that the ordinary
means which medical science affords for the treatment and care of this
disease will be exhausted prior to his death. On the contrary, during the
remainder of' his life medical care will be necessary to restrain the ravages
of the disease. His remaining life is, therefore, a reasonable time during
which to provide maintenance and cure. It follows tinder the principles of
the admiralty law to which we have referred that he is entitled to the cost
of his maintenance and care from the respondent during the remainder of
his life....
Id. at 87.
al '303 U.S. at 530.
as Id. at 531.
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meet the difficulties of medical disability, and not to provide a lifetime
pension.36
Valuable insight was also provided into the nature of damage
awards recoverable under the maintenance and cure remedy. Pursu-
ing the distinction between pension payments and the limited scope of
maintenance and cure liability, the Court stated that in cases where a
seaman brings an action for maintenance and cure prior to achieving
maximum physical improvement, the court may in its decision, award
the seaman damages to cover the cost of future ascertainable mainte-
nance and cure needs in addition to payment for costs already
expended." The Court made it clear, however, that such awards
would generally be very small and that the certainty of future ex-
penses would be essential to such a recovery. 38 This reluctance to
award large sums, even in cases where it was clear that some future
need would exist, stemmed in part from a desire to protect the sea-
man from his own improvidence: seamen receiving large awards
might be tempted to spend the money in ways unrelated to improving
their physical conditions."
In Farrell v. United Slates," decided eleven years after Ca/mar, the
Supreme Court more clearly articulated the reasoning and implica-
tions of the Calmar decision. In Farrell, the seaman was seriously in-
jured when he tripped over a guard rail while returning to the ship
after overstaying his shore leave. As a result of the injuries, the sea-
man suffered episodic attacks of headaches and epileptic convulsions"
from which he would stiffer for life. 42 In affirming the judgment of
the court below, the Supreme Court held that the policies which un-
derlie the doctrine would be distorted' if the seaman was allowed to
recover for the rest of his life; since maximum physical recovery had
been effected in the disability, no further payments were proper. 43
The Court also reiterated its concern, expressed in Calmar, for
distinguishing between pensions and maintenance and cure awards,
and for not awarding speculative lump sums in cases where liability
for maintenance and cure would continue beyond the present court
action:
It [maintenance and cure liability) does not hold a ship to a
permanent liability for a pension, neither does it give a
lump sum award based on some conception of expectancy
of life. Indeed the custom of providing maintenance and
cure in kind and concurrently with its need has had the ad-
36 1d. at 528, 530-31.
37 1d. at 531-32.
"Id. at 531.
" Id.
" 336 U.S. 511 (1949).
4'
	 at 512-13.
12 Id. at 513.
43 Id. at 519.
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vantage of removing its benefits from danger of being
wasted by the proverbial improvidence of its beneficiaries."
Finally, the Court expressly confirmed the implication of Calmar re-
garding the viability of successive maintenance and cure actions
brought prior to the time that the seaman achieves maximum physical
recovery."' Thus, the Calmar-Farrell formulation of the maintenance
and cure doctrine provided for entitlement to the remedy as long as
cure can produce physical improvement in the disability, with a previ-
ous termination of benefits not barring subsequent restoration if med-
ical knowledge can later effect improvement.
Against the background of the Calmar-Farrell interpretation of
the scope of the maintenance and cure doctrine, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals alone chose to pursue what it characterized as a log-
ical refinement of the maximum cure rule." In Neff v. Dravo Corp.,'"
the seaman was suffering from a number of physical disabilities which
were aggravated by chemical fumes in the engine room where he
worked. 4 H In a claim for maintenance and cure, the seaman sought
medical attention to arrest progressive deterioration of his physical
condition despite the fact that maximum physical improvement had
been achieved. 49
 The court held that in cases of deteriorating dis-
abilities, arrestive medical treatments are sufficiently curative in na-
ture so as to be encompassed within the doctrine of maintenance and
cure. 5° This holding was based upon the court's examination of pres-
ent day medical technology, and an evaluation of how the word
"cure" should be interpreted in light of such technology."
"Id. It is not dear from the opinion whether the "proverbial improvidence" of
seamen is a matter of judicial notice, or derived from some other authority. In Calmar,
the Court paraphrased Justice Story's evaluation of the conditions of being a seaman.
303 U.S. at 528, citing Harden v. Gordon, I I F. Cas. 480, 483 (No. 6047) (C.C.IJ. Me.
1823). See note 21 supra. This perception of the seaman's improvidence, however well
or ill founded, of itself seems to have been little considered beyond Justice Story's
stereotype in interpreting appropriate remedies under the maintenance and cure doc-
trine.
45
 336 U.S. at 519. The Court stated: "The Government does not contend that if
Farrell receives future treatment of a curative nature he may not recover in a new pro-
ceeding the amount expended for such treatment and for maintenance while receiving
it." Id.
"See Neff v. Dravo Corp., 407 F.2(1 228, 235 (3d Cir. 1969).
" 407 F.2d '228 (3d Cir.' 1969).
"Id. at 231.
40 Id. at 235.
5° Id.
51 The Neff court stated:
In this day of rapid change in the field of medicine and surgery, when
miracle drugs are daily advancing man's life expectancy and longevity is
increasing, the connotation of "cure" must be considered as a continuous
process. At least in cases where, as here, the medication is allegedly neces-
sary to arrest what would otherwise be a deteriorating condition, we think
it may be of a sufficiently curative nature to be encompassed within the




This same interpretation was applied in Ward v. Union Barge Line
Corp. 52 The seaman was suffering from an ulcer and abdominal ob-
structions which were the result of prolonged steroid treatments for
relief from arthritis, undertaken by the seaman while in the service of
the ship." The maintenance and cure claim was based upon the
seaman's total incapacity caused by the prolonged steroid
treatments, 54 and the subsequent need for arrestive medical
treatments. 55 The court in Ward reaffirmed the position taken in Neff
and held that the seaman was entitled to maintenance and cure."
The Neff decision referred to maintenance and cure entitlement
only with regard to arresting a deteriorating condition." In Ward, the
court interpreted Neff as sanctioning recovery for either the arrest of
deteriorating conditions, or relief of pain. While Ward seems to estab-
lish two separate bases for recovery, this distinction was not so clearly
made in Neff where the reference to reduction of pain was made in
the course of a quotation from the jury charge in the action below."
Thus, in the Neff and Ward decisions, the court apparently ex-
tended the definition of cure to encompass medical treatments which
are employed to alleviate pain resulting from disabilities which have
reached a plateau of physical recovery" or are employed to arrest
what would otherwise be a deteriorating disability."
In Cox, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had an opportunity
to re-examine their definition of "cure" in light of the Supreme
Court's development and interpretation of the maintenance and cure
doctrine. Upon consideration of the existing case law, the court felt
bound to overrule the Neff and Ward decisions" to the extent that
they allow maintenance and cure for the reduction of pain after max-
imum physical improvement of the disability has been achieved. 62
55 443 17.2d 565 (3d Cir. 1971).
53 Id. at 567.
54 Id.
5' Id. at 572.
"Id.
67 407 F.2d at 235.
" 443 F.2d at 572.
55 Id. at 572.
"Id. at 572; Neff; 407 F.2d at 235. It is anomalous that the Third Circuit chose,
in the Neff and Waid"decisions, to pursue this definition of cure. Calmar represented a
reversal of a Third Circuit appeal in which the seaman claimed entitlement to mainte-
nance and cure on the basis of possesSing a disability of deteriorating character. See
note 33 supra and accompanying text.
0 ' 517 F.2d at 621.
62 Id. at 627 (concurring opinion). In his concurring opinion, Judge Sictz stated
that the decision in Cox was limited to reduction of pain and that in cases in which the
disability is of a deteriorating character, a different rule might apply. This argument
was buttressed by citing dicta in Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, (1975), in which the
Supreme Court indicated that in such situations a rule different than that previously
applied might be appropriate. The Court stated:
[It] is not necessary to address the question whether the jury award might
also be sustained on the ground that the shipowner's duty in any event ob-
liged him to provide palliative medical care to arrest further progress of
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While the Third Circuit's opinion in Cox is less than clear with regard
to the bases for rejecting the plaintiffs claim, the implication is that
the court has found, in reduction of; pain cases, a sufficient similarity
to the disability situations in Farrell and Vella v. Ford Motor Co." The
court further stressed that since the argument favoring the allowance
of maintenance and cure was rejected by the Supreme Court in
Calmar for reduction of pain," continued application of a rule differ-
ent than that applied by the Supreme Court was tantamount to ex-
ceeding their proper law-making authority."
It is submitted that the Third Circuit in Cox properly overruled
Neff and Ward to the extent that they sanctioned recovery for the al-
leviation of pain. The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed
the issue of whether cure may be awarded to reduce pain after the
achievement of maximum physical improvement. In Vella," The Su-
preme Court's latest decision on the scope of the maintenance and
cure doctrine, the Court seemed to open the door by way of dicta to
the argument that recovery for the reduction of pain after maximum
physical recovery has been achieved should be subject to considera-
tions not yet articulated by the maximum cure rule." Nevertheless, it
can be strongly argued that if and when the Court is presented with
this specific issue, it will decide, as did the Third Circuit in Cox, that
such damages are not properly recoverable in an action for mainte-
nance and cure.
This argument is amply supported by past Supreme Court deci-
the condition or to reduce pain, and we intimate no view whatever upon
the shipowner's duty in that regard.
Id. at 5 n.4.
63
 421 U.S. 1 (1975). See text at notes 67-68 infra.
"517 F.2d at 627. In Calmar, the reduction of pain and arresting of a deteriorat-
ing condition were both aspects of the claim for maintenance, although not presented
as alternative grounds for entitlement. The Supreme Court apparently rejected the via-
bility of recovery based on either or both grounds. See 303 U.S. at 530.
66 517 F.2d at 627.
" In Vella, the Court introduced the distinction between disabilities which are
permanent (at the time of illness or injury) but not so diagnosed at the time of injury,
and disabilities which are declared to be permanent for purposes of judicial considera-
tion. 421 U.S. at 5-6. The Court stated that in cases in which the disability has become
permanent immediately after the illness or injury, upon leaving the service of the ship,
the seaman is entitled to maintenance and cure until a medical diagnosis of permanency
is made; the date of such diagnosis being the date at which the shipowner is released
from further maintenance and cure liability. Id. at 5.
Precisely who must make the medical diagnosis was not made clear by the Court.
Presumably, a ship's physician would be competent to make such a determination in a
majority of cases (those not involving the expertise of medical specialists). This interpre-
tation would appear to be in accord with Desmond v. United States, 217 F.2d 948, 950
(2d Cir. 1959), upon which the Vella court relied. 421 U.S. at 6 n. 5. The thrust of this
interpretation focuses upon the reliability of the determination of permanency, rather
than simply who makes that determination. Of course, Vella presumes that any deter-
mination made by someone other than a medical practitioner is faulty, regardless of ex-
trinsic factors which might render that determination in fact accurate.
67 421 U.S. at 5 n. 4. See note 65 supra.
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sions. In both Farrell and Vella, plaintiffs based their claim to mainte-
nance and cure upon a showing that their disabilities involved
episodic flare-ups for which medication would yield symptomatic
relief." In both of these cases, the Court strictly adhered to the physi-
cal improvement aspect of the maximum cure rule, concluding that
because symptomatic relief would not "improve" the plaintiffs' under-
lying disability, an award for such relief could not be made. 6"
Physical pain, like the convulsions and dizzy spells involved in
Farrell and Vella, is generally an episodic phenomenon. It is the man-
ifestation of a physical disorder rather than the cause of it. Even
though it may be intense, and physically disabling in its own right, like
convulsions and dizziness it. does not aggravate the condition from
which it arises. If the occurrence of pain is thus correctly analogized
to the episodic disabilities in Farrell and Vella, it appears that just as
recovery will not be allowed for the avoidance of episodic convulsions
and dizzy spells, once maximum cure is effectuated, recovery should
similarly not be allowed for the reduction of pain.
The concurring opinion of Judge Sietz, in perhaps the most sig-
nificant aspect of Cox, implied that a different result may be appro-
priate where the seaman's claim is for payments to arrest a deteriorat-
ing condition. 7 ° Dicta in Vella provided the basis for this implication.
In Vella, the Court stated:
[It] is not necessary to address the question whether the
jury award might also be sustained on the ground that the
shipowner's duty in any event obliged him to provide pal-
liative medical care to arrest further progress of the condi-
tion or to reduce pain, and we intimate no view whatever
upon the shipowner's duty in that regard."
The concurring opinion stated that the deteriorating condition issue
has not been addressed by the Supreme Court, and in view of the
facts of Cox, the Third Circuit should not express an authoritative
view on the issue.
It is submitted that the concurring opinion in Cox has read too
much into the Vella dicta. In Calmar, the Supreme Court specifically
rejected the Third Circuit's assertion that deteriorating disabilities are
subject to judicial consideration which extends beyond the traditional
ambit of the maximum cure rule. 72 In Cox, the Third Circuit explicitly
recognized the need to modify its application of the maximum cure
rule in order to be in conformity with the rule applied by the Su-
" Farrell, 336 U.S. at 513 (claim based upon the need for medication which con-
trolled attacks of headache and epileptic convulsions); Vella, 421 U.S. at 3 n. 3 (claim
based upon the need for medication to control dizziness resulting from injury to the
inner ear).
1") See Vella, 421 U.S: at 3; Farrell, 336 U.S. at 519.
70 517 F. 2d at 627.
" 421 U.S. at 5 n. 4,
"See text at notes 33-40 supra.
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preme Court." Unless the Vella dicta provides a basis for such differ-
ent treatment, as implied by the concurring opinion, the concurring
opinion diluted this objective of conformity by suggesting that de-
teriorating disabilities fall outside the ambit of the traditional max-
imum cure rule.
The Vella dicta does not appear to provide such a basis. Argu-
ably, the dicta only indicates that the Supreme Court was not pre-
sented with these issues, and thus is indicating that no determination
of them is necessary. This interpretation is considerably different
from that proposed in the concurring opinion in Cox, which interprets
the language as an authoritative statement of the Supreme Court's
willingness to reconsider these issues. The argument that the Vella
dicta is inconclusive is buttressed by the fact that the dicta contains a
reference to reduction of pain, and it is highly unlikely that the Court
would change the rule in this regard."
lf, however, the'dicta in Vella does indicate a willingness on the
part of the Supreme Court to reconsider the issue of deteriorating
disabilities, the time is then especially ripe to take a close look at this
issue. Three specific questions are raised by this examination: (1)
whether awards for arresting a deteriorating condition can be encom-
passed within the present definition of the maximum cure rule; (2) if
not, whether a change in the scope of recovery to accommodate such
awards would be consistent with the policy considerations underlying
maintenance and cure; and (3) whether such a change would upset
the administrative objectives upon which the maintenance and cure
remedy is presently based.
It appears that by slightly expanding the present scope of the
maximum cure doctrine, allowance can be made for awards to arrest
deteriorating conditions. As noted above, the Supreme Court, in
Calmar and Farrell, has clearly distinguished between pension pay-
ments and the proper scope of maintenance and cure payments." As
maintenance and cure awards are fashioned to embrace lengthening
periods of time, however, this distinction has become less clear. To al-
leviate this difficulty, the Court has allowed successive actions for
maintenance and cure upon a showing that the claim is properly re-
lated to ascertainable medical needs." The crux of finding ascertaina-
ble need is a showing that the treatments will result in definite physi-
cal improvement. 77
" 5l7 F. 2d at 621.
" See text at notes 68-72 supra.
73 See text at notes 36 and 44 supra.
76 See Farrell, 336 U.S. at 512-13, 519; Calmar, 303 U.S. at 530-32.
"See Farrell, 336 U.S. at 518; Calmar, 303 U.S. at 531-32. Cf. Scott v. Lykes Bros.
S.S. Co., 152 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. La. 1957). In Scott, the plaintiff was crippled as a result
of a brain injury sustained while in the service of the ship. In a previous maintenance
and cure action, the seaman's benefits had been terminated when the court found that
his condition had reached a static physical level. The seaman voluntarily entered a re-
habilitation hospital of his own choosing, and after an extended period of therapy, re-
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Viewing the arrest of deteriorating disabilities within this
framework, it may be argued that a definition of cure which would
allow payments in deteriorating disability situations is not inconsistent
with the present Calmar-Farrell formulation of the rule. Medical
treatments employed in deteriorating disability situations will gener-
ally follow one of two patterns. They will either effect physical im-
provement, to some degree, in the deteriorated condition, or they will
arrest the progress of the condition as long as the treatment is con-
tinued. In the first situation, actual physical improvement, albeit tem-
porary, is effected by the treatment. This fact might be viewed as suf-
ficient to satisfy the requirements of physical improvement under the
Calmar-Farrell definition of cure." In the second type of deteriorating
disability situation, without the medical treatment, the seaman's condi-
tion will decline from the plateau which the treatments are capable of
maintaining. If maximum cure means achievement of a static level of
physical improvement—which has been intimated by several lower
federal courts 7 " reasoning within the Calmar-Farrell framework—then
maximum cure is reached and maintained only through the use of the
arrestive medical treatment. The treatments are curative since max-
imum physical improvement is not achieved without their continued
use. If "improvement" is thus defined in this relative sense, rather
than in terms of a segmented linear progression, 8 ° the allowance of
gained the partial use of his limbs and vocal faculties. The court stated:
This court holds that maximum cure, as defined by the Supreme Court, is
not achieved by the administration of pills and poultices alone, that max-
imum cure is reached, in the circumstances of this case, when, through the
application of modern methods of rehabilitation under medical supervi-
sion, the seaman is returned, as near as may be, to the status of a func-
tional human being.
Id. at 105.
Based on this language, it seems that the seaman regained physical control of
some of his bodily functions through the development of alternative locomotor coordi-
nation, rather than actual physical repair of the disabled portions of the body. In
awarding the seaman maintenance and cure, the district court thus appears to have ex-
tended the definition of cure beyond that of the actual physical improvement of the in-
jured tissues.
"Farrell incorporated the standard described in the Shipowner's Liability Con-
vention of 1936, 54 Stat. 1693, 1696, which provided in article 4, paragraph 1: "The
shipowner shall be liable to defray the expense of medical care and maintenance until
the sick or injured person has been cured, or until the sickness or incapacity has been
declared of a permanent character." 336 U.S. at 517. Calmar conditioned entitlement to
maintenance and cure upon a showing of improvement in the seaman's condition. Os-
tensibly, this meant improvement in the physical manifestations of the disability as well
as actual improvement in the affected tissues. 303 U.S. at 530. Farrell did not, however,
address this distinction, and it is unclear precisely what the Supreme Court's position is.
See Scott v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 152 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. La. 1957).
7" See, e.g., Martinez v. Permanente S.S. Corp., 237 F. Supp. 380, 383 (D. Hawaii
1965), affd, 369 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1966).
"" 'PhisT  phrase is used to describe the judicial view that once a plateau of physical
improvement is reached, that plateau is characterized as maximum cure, regardless of
the fact that the Plateau may not be stable. See, e.g., Vella, 421 U.S. I; Farrell, 336 U.S.
511.
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maintenance and cure where medical treatments are necessary to ar-
rest a deteriorating disability is not inconsistent with the Calmar-Farrell
definition of cure. Moreover, since the treatments are demonstrably
related to the medical needs of the seaman, the distinction between
pensions and maintenance and cure awards is preserved. By thus
slightly expanding the scope of the maintenance and cure rule, in a
manner not inconsistent with the present Calmar-Farrell formulation,
awards can be made to arrest deteriorating conditions.
This expansion of the present rule would not violate the under-
lying policies of the maintenance and cure doctrine. A basic objective
of the doctrine is to protect seamen from the hardships of disabilities
by providing financial assistance during periods when the seaman is
unable to engage in his trade." This objective is effectuated by pro-
vidinglseamen with adequate payments without undue delay" while at
the same time avoiding imposition of an undue financial burden upon
shipowners. 83 In a dissenting opinion in Farrell, justice Douglas ob-
served that the primary focus of the maintenance and cure doctrine
should be the welfare of the seaman rather than the financial burden
that the maintenance and cure doctrine imposes upon shipowners."
This assessment may be overly one-sided; however, the same criticism
is applicable to any definition of the maximum cure rule which does
not provide payments to arrest deteriorating conditions. Such a defin-
ition places primary emphasis on maintaining low operating costs for
shipowners while ignoring the seaman's need for adequate payments.
The need for medical treatment to arrest deteriorating dis-
abilities is manifest. If a disabled seaman is unable to subscribe to ar-
restive medical treatments because of an inability to meet the costs
involved," the disability may deteriorate such that future medical ad-
vances which could have cured the disability had it been arrested
would now be ineffective. To a seaman in such a situation, the right
to bring successive actions is of no consequence because the disease
will have deteriorated to a state where it cannot be said that medical
treatment will effect cure. The right to successive actions has meaning
only if, in the interim, a seaman is allowed funds so that he might re-
ceive treatment which will prevent the disease from deteriorating to
an incurable level. Thus, it appears that an expansion of the mainte-
nance and cure doctrine to accommodate payments to arrest de-
teriorating conditions is supported by the policy considerations which
underlie the doctrine.
Finally, it appears that such an expansion of the maximum cure
" Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Gas. 480, 483 (No. 6047) (C.C.D. Me. 1823).
41
 Vella, 421 U.S. at 4.
Ha See id. at 4.
44 336 U.S. at 523 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas felt that maintenance and
cure payments were part of the cost of doing business. Id.
" See note 10 supra. This situation might arise in cases where the marine hospi-




rule would not frustrate the basic administrative objectives upon
which the doctrine is based. The doctrine seeks to create a structure
of rights and duties which are clear and readily understandable to the
parties involved thereby avoiding frequent resort to the courts." The
present policy of allowing successive actions for maintenance and cure
has been a roadblock to this objective. Since later recovery in a
maintenance and cure action is dependent upon a showing of actual
physical improvement, a seaman who avails himself of potentially
curative treatment at his own initial expense runs the risk of no re-
covery in a subsequent action if the treatment proves unsuccessful,
further adding confusion as to what rights and liabilities flow from
the doctrine."
Some of the administrative difficulties of the maintenance and
cure doctrine might be remedied by considering the institution of a
system functionally similar to workmen's compensation. In some re-
spects, maintenance and cure is analogous to workmen's
compensation." In both cases, the duty to provide the benefits arises
out of the relationship between the employer and the employee,
rather than from any negligence by the employer to the employee."
However, maintenance and cure, unlike workmen's compensation is
not a substitute for potential tort actions;" the seaman is still able to
institute suit under the Jones Act"' for the negligence of the ship-
owner, or the unseaworthiness of the vessel, irrespective of potential
actions for maintenance and cure." Because of the greater liberality
of the maintenance and cure doctrine," seamen have understandably
preferred this doctrine over workmen's compensation programs.""
The solution to any administrative problems created by allowing pay-
ments to arrest deteriorating conditions may thus lie in the adoption
of a new system which incorporates the mechanics of the workmen's
compensation program while at the same time embodying the greater
liberality of the traditional seaman's remedy. This system may also be
more suitable for effectuating the other objectives of the maintenance
and cure doctrine and may actually be more amenable to both seamen
and shipowners.
Under this proposed system, a federal board could be estab-
" See Farrell, 336 U.S. at 516; Vella, 421 U.S. at 4.
" See text at note 77 supra. In Scott v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., l52 F. Supp. 104
(E.D. La. 1957), recovery presumably would have been denied if the rehabilitative
treatments had proven unsuccessful since no improvement of any type would have re-
sulted.
"" Comment, 5 U. SAN FRAN. L. RE.v. 105, 110 (1970).
"" Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U,S. 367, 371 (1932).
'10 G. GILNIORE Se C. BLACK, THE. LAW Or ADMIRALTY 281 (1975).
°1 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
" Cones v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 371 (1932). See Calmar,
303 U.S. at 528.
"' 2 M. NORRIS. THE LAW or SEAMEN § 577 at 99 (3d ed. 1970),
44 Freedman, Recent Trends in the Controversy Over the Extension of Workmen's Com-
pensation Into The Maritime and Railroad Fields. 4 NACCA L.J. 229, 231 (1949).
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lished to administer the benefits which accrue under the maintenance
and cure doctrine after the seaman is no longer "in the service of the
ship." Shipowners would pay compulsory premiums to cover the costs
of administering the program. The amount payable could be based
upon fixed rate scales, or upon pre-determined "loss ratios" calculated
upon the amounts that the shipowner has previously paid in mainte-
nance and cure benefits to injured seamen. This system would not
create an undue financial burden upon the shipowner because the
costs of the premiums would ultimately be passed on to the consum-
ing public which would pay slightly increased rates for shipping
services. 95
 The burden of the premium would further be lessened by
incorporating an aspect of the present system: the seaman's access to
the marine hospitals on a reduced or no-cost basis 96
 which presently is
provided not by the shipowner but independently by the federal
government. 97
From the seaman's perspective, such a system could operate to
provide greater simplicity and certainty as to benefits available under
the maintenance and cure doctrine. The board could appoint a com-
mittee which would pass upon the certainty of proposed medical cures
in cases where the seaman wishes to avail himself of treatment at in-
dependent medical facilities because superior care is available at such
facilities. This procedure would mitigate the uncertainty, discussed
above, of receiving treatments at the risk of not achieving actual phys-
ical recovery. In addition, to obviate the judicial concern for awarding
lump sums which might not be used by the seaman for proper medi-
cal treatment," payments could be made directly to the medical facil-
ity, at specified intervals, for the costs of cure, with the seaman receiv-
ing only direct payments for maintenance while undergoing the cura-
tive treatment. The medical facility would provide the board with
periodic reports regarding the progress of the cure, and once cure
was completed, the benefits would terminate. The seaman would still
be entitled to later bring similar petitions to the board if future medi-
cal advances indicated that further cure of the permanent disability
could be achieved.""
CONCLUSION
In Cox, the Third Circuit abandoned its earlier position to align
itself with Supreme Court pronouncements on the maintenance and
cure remedy. In so doing, the court concluded that payments for the
alleviation of pain are not included under maintenance and cure once
" Comment, 5 U. SAN FRAN. L. RF:V, 105, 111 (1970)
"See 2 M. NORRIS, supra note 93, § 591.
" See note 10 supra.
" See text at notes 38-39 supra.
99 This procedure would be a substitute for the currently available procedure of
bringing a successive action for maintenance and cure. See text at notes 40-45 supra.
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the seaman is permanently disabled. It appears that the Cox decision
was correctly decided given the present case law. Implications in the
concurring opinion in Cox suggest that the Supreme Court may be
disposed to reach a different result with regard to payments to arrest
deteriorating conditions. While this reading of high court precedents
is subject to question, it does appear that a basis may exist to provide
maintenance and cure in such cases. Expanding the scope of the max-
imum cure rule to allow for treatment of deteriorating disabilities and
the institution of a federal seamen's compensation board would serve
to transform maintenance and cure into a doctrine more equitable for
the seaman and more understandable for all parties concerned.
MICHAEL AHCARIAN
Motor Vehicle Safety—National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act—Definition of Safety-Related Defects under Notice Pro-
visions—Manufacturer's Obligations —United States v. General
Motors Corp. '—On September 4, 1968, the National Highway Safety
Bureau (NHSB)2 received a letter3 which reported an injury-
producing accident caused by the failure of a General Motors (GM)
product known as the Kelsey-Hayes wheel 4 (Wheels) which had been
installed on many GM pickup trucks. In response to the letter, and in
view of the wide-spread use of the Wheels, 5 the NHSB initiated an in-
vestigation pursuant to section 113(e) of the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (NTMVSA) 6
 to determine whether
518 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
The NHSB is now the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. See id.
at 426 11.5 & 428.
3
 The letter was sent by consumer advocate Ralph Nader. Id. at 428.
The three-piece 15 X 5.50 Kelsey-Hayes disc wheel was introduced by GM in
the fall of 1959 as an option item. Id. at 427.
A total of 810,000 Wheels were installed on approximately 200,000 of the
321,743 GM trucks manufactured during the 1960-65 model years. Id. at 427. It is es-
timated that 50,000 of these trucks have been equipped with campers or special bodies.
Id. at 429.
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. H 1381-1431
(1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1391 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974). Section 113(e). 15 U.S.C.
l402(e) (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C. * 1412 (Supp. IV, 1974), provides:
(c) If through ... investigation ... the Secretary determines that any
motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment ... (2) contains a defect
which relates to motor vehicle safety; then he shall immediately notify the
manufacturer: of such motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment of
such defect The Secretary shall afford such manufacturer an oppor-
tunity to present his views and evidence .... If after such presentation by
the manufacturer the Secretary determines that such ... item of equip-
ment ... contains a defect which relates to motor safety, the Secretary
shall direct the manufacturer to furnish notification to the pur-
chaser of such motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment
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